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Abstract: This study provides an empirical, practical measure of the citation practices of the two highest courts in the state of Indiana during a recent ten-year span (1994-2003).  It focuses on the type of legal materials most frequently cited as authority, examining the importance of both primary and secondary sources.  It also demonstrates the importance of housing and maintaining complete appellate briefs from the two highest courts in the state of Indiana.
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A number of researchers and writers have attempted to explain the influence of legal citations in various parts of the country, as well as Canada.​[2]​ None have tackled the citation practices of the two highest courts in the state of Indiana. With the proliferation of statutes in the Indiana Code, and the Indiana courts’ consistent and increasing reliance on citations from a number of different sources, it has become crucial to study which sources are most relied upon by these courts. As one author eloquently notes, “Citations are signposts left behind after information has been utilized and as such provide data by which one may build pictures of user behavior without ever confronting the user himself."​[3]​ 
There are other equally compelling reasons for studying citation practices.  Successful appellate advocacy for legal practitioners and law students depends at least in part on anticipating how an appellate panel utilizes various legal authorities to resolve issues before it.​[4]​ Frequently, if not always, appellate cases present complex or novel issues involving unsettled areas of law. Resolving such issues often requires a wide-ranging examination of authorities cited by the appellate courts.​[5]​
Proponents of citation-based studies (also called “bibliometrics”) have consistently argued that such rankings provide a measure of the relative influence of citation sources on legal scholarship and courts.​[6]​  Critics of citation-based rankings contend that citation “idiosyncrasies” in legal scholarship render such rankings largely invalid.​[7]​ The goal of this article is not to add fuel to the on-going debate about the influence of citation sources but to provide an empirical, practical measure of the citation practices of the two highest courts in Indiana. More specifically, the aim of this research project is to forecast the legal resource needs of legal practitioners, law students and law faculty by providing an accurate accounting of the legal authorities relied upon most heavily by the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals in the last decade. 
The study will highlight for appellate practitioners the most recent citation trends of the two courts, and focus on the type of legal materials most frequently cited as authority. For law students and law educators, the study will examine the importance of both secondary and primary sources. For law librarians and collection managers, the study will demonstrate the importance of housing and maintaining complete appellate briefs from the two highest courts in the state.
II.  Methodology
This study of the citation practices of the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals spans a ten-year period (1994-2003).  The writers selected this decade because it provided the most up to date and accurate sample of citations in both electronic and print format.  In those rare situations where the electronic version was not identical to the print, the authors always relied on the print format. Moreover, the chosen decade provided uniformity for the writers, since both Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals cases were exclusively reported in the Northeastern Reporter, Second Edition.​[8]​  This time period also correlates with the date range of the bulk of the library’s Indiana appellate brief collection, supporting the writers’ desire to study the impact and importance of briefs in citation practices of the two courts.   
Although most writers have selected at least three sample years to analyze, the current study sampled four years: 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2003. In order to obtain a significant and representative sample for each of the studied years, 100 cases per sample year from each of the courts were selected in a random fashion. 
It is important to mention that all cites were recorded as long as they were distinct from each other.  If an opinion was cited more than once in a case but different issues of the cited opinion were discussed, both cites were treated as distinct.  Any citation to a code or a regulation was counted separately as long as there was a distinct subdivision indicating different code or regulation sections.  All parts of the opinion were studied and analyzed, including dissenting opinions. All 800 cases were checked manually for accuracy.  
III. Sources Analyzed
Some commentators have restricted their data collection to certain types of legal authority, sometimes excluding constitutions, statutes, and regulations​[9]​ from their surveys or limiting their investigations to law reviews,​[10]​ secondary source citations,​[11]​ or particular types of opinions.​[12]​  This study, on the other hand, sought to provide a complete picture of Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals citation practices by combing the opinions for a comprehensive array of cited authorities.
A.  Primary Authority
Since only primary authority is binding,​[13]​ these types of sources were naturally a major focus of the study.  In this article the following types of primary authority were tabulated separately: 
	Indiana Supreme Court cases
	Indiana Court of Appeals cases
	cases from the states that are geographically contiguous to Indiana (Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, and Ohio)
	cases from all other states
	federal cases
	Indiana statutes
	statutes and administrative law from contiguous states
	statutes and administrative law from all other states
	federal statutes and administrative law

Primary authorities from contiguous and non-contiguous states were tallied separately to determine whether Indiana courts, when citing to authority from other states, display a greater reliance on their neighbors than on other states.  
B.  Secondary Authority
The persuasive weight judges grant to secondary authorities is a much debated question.  Some studies have shown a large increase in the use of secondary source citations,​[14]​ while others have discovered a decline.​[15]​  To assess the usage of secondary authorities by Indiana courts, cites to the following types of sources were counted:






	Law reviews and legal journals

C.  Appellate Briefs
While citations to primary and secondary sources of law were the focus of the study, special attention was paid to citations to appellate briefs filed before the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals.  In recent years, appellate briefs have become recognized as an increasingly valuable resource for legal researchers, especially as sources of background information and examples to be used to develop arguments in similar cases.​[16]​  Although wholesale citation to appellate briefs as authority for appellate arguments is totally inappropriate​[17]​, amicus briefs have become important as a litigating device for interest groups and as a source of information for the highest appellate courts in the nation.​[18]​ 
The Ruth Lilly Law Library of the Indiana University School of Law--Indianapolis is a major depository of briefs from the Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Court of Appeals.  Specifically, the library features select Indiana Supreme Court briefs dating back as far as 1923, while the most complete sets of Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Court of Appeals briefs date back to 1992.  Each brief is labeled with the same docket number as the appellate case so that a researcher can readily locate these resources.  Often attached to each brief are appendices, exhibits, or the lower court opinion making up the record before the two courts of appeals.​[19]​  The two Indiana appellate courts frequently alternate between citing to the record and citing to the briefs of the parties involved.​[20]​  It was therefore impossible to distinguish a citation to the record that includes the content of the briefs from a citation to the record intended to preclude the content of the briefs. As a result, the authors decided to cluster together citations to the record and those to the briefs of the parties in a single column. 
IV. General Results
A fundamental assumption about the judicial process is that jurists cite authorities in decisions because they are either bound by them or find them compelling to the resolution of the presented legal issue(s).​[21]​  To the extent that we can identify patterns in the uses of authority in general, we can make more informed estimates about how the appellate courts will respond to the different types of authority in various situations.​[22]​  
A) Judicial Opinion Citations in General
Tables 1 and 2 contain citations to primary authority from Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Court of Appeals cases.  The judicial opinion was by far the most cited source by both the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals. Throughout the sample years studied, judicial opinions were most heavily cited by the Indiana Court of Appeals. Between 1994 and 2003 the Indiana Court of Appeals cited to case law 56.34% of the time (see Table 2).  The Indiana Supreme Court cited to court cases almost as often, 54.86% of the time (see Table 1). The Indiana Supreme Court is the single most cited source among all judicial opinions. 
During the sample period (1994-2003), the Indiana Supreme Court cited to itself some 56.86% of the time (see Chart 1).  Meanwhile, the Indiana Court of Appeals cited to the Indiana’s highest court 29.71% of the time (see Chart 2). Although the statistical findings for the Indiana Supreme Court are very much in tune with other articles that have analyzed citation practices showing a definite preference for the opinions of the state’s highest court​[23]​, the results for the Indiana Court of Appeals do not support this trend. The gathered information shows that the Indiana Court of Appeals highly prefers citing to itself, as it cited to itself some 52.9% of the time between 1994 and 2003 (Chart 2).  Traditionally, intermediate appellate courts have cited most often to the courts of last resort in their jurisdiction.  These findings are significant because they show a break in traditional citation practices.​[24]​ 
This conclusion is again supported when analyzing how many times each court cited to the Indiana Court of Appeals. The Indiana Supreme Court only cited to the Indiana Court of Appeals decisions some 19.21% of the time while, as earlier mentioned, citing to itself some 56.9% of the time (Chart 1). The Indiana Court of Appeals cited to itself almost twice as often as citing to the highest court in Indiana (52.9% vs. 29.71%) (Chart 2).
B) State Court Decisions
There was a basic presumption, largely based on the composition of the Ruth Lilly Law Library collection, that there would be a preference by the two highest courts in Indiana for citations from contiguous sister states (Michigan, Ohio, Illinois and Kentucky).  This was not the case. 
Both the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals consistently cited more often to opinions of state courts from non-contiguous states than to decisions from the state judiciary of the above mentioned contiguous states. The Indiana Supreme Court cited to state judicial holdings from non-contiguous states some 3.03% of the time versus only 0.64% of the time to state judicial opinions from contiguous states (Table 1). The Indiana Court of Appeals followed a very similar trend.  It cited judicial holdings from non-contiguous state courts 2.61% of the time while citing to the opinions of courts from contiguous states only 0.33% of the time between 1994 and 2003 (Table 2).
Some of the explanation may be found in the fact that only four out of the other 49 states are contiguous to Indiana, and therefore the statistical likelihood is more than 11 times greater that some helpful holding will be found in one of the state courts of the 45 non-contiguous states plus the District of Columbia. The other part of the explanation rests with the fact that non-contiguous state jurisprudence contains the case law rich states of New York and California, making it more likely that an issue was already decided by those state courts than one of the state courts in the four contiguous states. 
C)  Federal Court Opinion Citations
Citations to various federal judicial opinions have more than doubled for the Indiana Supreme Court from 1994 to 2003 (Table 1).  In 1994 the Indiana Supreme Court cited to 151 federal court opinions.  This number increased to 346 in 2003.  The same trend is applicable to the Indiana Court of Appeals’ citations (Table 2).   This court cited to federal case law 81 times in 1994 and some 149 times in 2003.  There are a couple of reasons for this growing trend.  On one hand, there are greater numbers of civil cases with constitutional or regulatory questions that likely include multiple citations to federal opinions.​[25]​  On the other hand, the increased use of federal opinions has followed the growing number of opinions involving criminal issues.​[26]​ An increase in the complexity of case law has naturally translated into greater numbers of federal case law citations. 
D)  Secondary Sources
Tables 3 and 4 contain citations to secondary authority from Indiana Supreme Court and Indiana Court of Appeals cases.  Secondary sources proved to be the least utilized category of authority by both appellate courts in Indiana.  During the time period from 1994 and 2003, the Indiana Supreme Court cited to secondary authorities a total of 216 times, comprising only 2.42% of its total citations (see Table 3). At the same time, the Indiana Court of Appeals referred to secondary resources a total of 116 times during the same time period, amounting to 1.53% of its total citations (see Table 4). These citation trends conform to the results found by other authors who have analyzed citation practices of state appellate courts.​[27]​
The single most cited secondary sources by both Indiana appellate courts were treatises.  Law reviews and legal journals were the second most cited secondary resource by the Indiana Supreme Court (Table 3).  In contrast, the Indiana Court of Appeals preferred to cite more often to the restatements than to individual law reviews or legal journals (Table 4). According to these results, there is clear evidence that scholarly writing has not had a significant effect on either of the studied Indiana appellate courts during the last decade.
The remaining references were generally made to traditional legal encyclopedias and annotations.  Out of all these resources, the only category that approached the law from a critical perspective was that of the law review; the other forms tend to be summary or descriptive in nature.​[28]​  The majority of references to secondary sources are “baseline citations”.​[29]​ This term refers to the practice of citing a secondary source for a basic, settled proposition of law instead of referring to a line of cases.​[30]​ Some authors argue that this citation trend represents an efficient method of providing authority for undisputed points of law, and hence it is very useful in clearing away uncontested points of analysis in complex cases.​[31]​ 
E) Other Sources
The authors also found that there were significant amounts of citations pertaining to federal and state court procedure and ethics rules utilized by both courts. The Indiana Supreme Court cited to an Indiana court or ethics rule some 1309 times, or 14.05% of the time between 1994 and 2003 (Table 3) The Indiana Court of Appeals cited to the same set of rules some 583 times or about 7.34% of the time during the same period (Table 4).  Neither court cited a significant amount of the time to federal court rules; the Indiana Supreme Court cited to them 1.81% of the time (Table 3), whereas the Indiana Court of Appeals cited them only 0.97% of the time (Table 4). 
The dramatic difference between the citation trends of the two courts is clearly attributed to the Indiana court rules pertaining to the discipline of both attorneys and judicial officers. Rule 23 provides the Indiana Supreme Court with the sole authority to review a hearing officer’s findings stemming from a disciplinary proceeding pertaining to an alleged misconduct by an admitted attorney.​[32]​ At the same time, in cases where judicial officers have been charged with misconduct, they may only petition the Indiana Supreme Court within 30 days of the filing of the Disciplinary Commission’s report.​[33]​ These citation trends concur with the findings of other authors.​[34]​ 
Finally, it is important to mention that neither court cited much to either state or federal administrative laws in the studied sample. The Indiana Supreme Court cited to administrative laws in only 27 instances, representing 0.29% of the total citations (Table 1). The Indiana Court of Appeals cited to a total of 49 administrative laws, making up 0.62% of the total sample of citations (Table 2). These citation trends, once again, concur with the findings of other authors.​[35]​ 
V.   Appellate Briefs
The most unique aspect of this study is the two courts’ trend in citing to appellate briefs. The Indiana Supreme Court cited to appellate briefs a total of 904 times or 9.71% of the time (Table 2).  For the highest court in Indiana, appellate briefs are the fourth largest category of citation sources.  Between 1994 and 2003 the Indiana Supreme Court cited more often to appellate briefs than to administrative law and secondary authority combined. The Indiana Court of Appeals cited to appellate briefs a total of 1147 times or 14.44% of the time (Table 4).  For this court, appellate briefs represent the third most cited category of sources after case law and statutes.  In short, appellate briefs represent a significant portion of the sources cited by both appellate courts in Indiana.
The most surprising aspect of our findings is that the courts’ growing trend of citation to appellate briefs has been reversed in year 2003 (see Chart 3).  The Indiana Supreme Court cited to appellate briefs 86 times in the year 1994, 196 times in 1997, 415 times in 2000 and dropped to only 207 citations in the year 2003. The same trend held true for the Indiana Court of Appeals. It cited to appellate briefs some 97 times in the year 1994, 363 times in 1997, 592 times in 2000, while dropping to only 95 cites to appellate briefs for the calendar year 2003. 
While the “bell curve” shape of the trend signals that the two courts are currently on the downward slope of citing directly to appellate briefs, there is an unmistakable trend of growth that cannot be ignored. For example, the Indiana Supreme Court trend of citation to appellate briefs has never fallen below 207 cites for the studied period. This shows that even though the number of citations to appellate briefs fell in 2003, the general trend for citations to briefs is on the rise.
Appellate briefs are inherently valuable in a law school environment. In addition to providing accurate step-by-step examples for law students of how to prepare an appellate brief, from the statement of jurisdiction right through to the conclusion, the briefs also contain tables of citations or authorities that afford the legal researcher relevant cases on the issues litigated before appellate courts during that time period.  Often attached to the briefs are opinions of the trial courts and various reports.  These related opinions and orders are frequently unreported and unobtainable electronically or without significant inconvenience, making appellate briefs a very valuable and unique resource for both law students and practicing attorneys.
VI.  Conclusion
“To paraphrase Thomas Hobbes: to be cited regularly, is felicity; to be cited most, bliss; and not to be cited at all, death.”​[36]​
This study represents the first accounting of the legal authorities relied upon most heavily by the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals between 1994 and 2003. The citation trends of the two studied appellate courts in Indiana generally resemble a number of published trends exhibited by other appellate courts. 
First, the judicial opinion was by far the most often cited source by both the Indiana Supreme Court as well as the Indiana Court of Appeals. The Indiana Supreme Court was the single most cited source among all judicial opinions. Although the statistical findings for the Indiana Supreme Court are very much in tune with other articles that have analyzed citation practices showing a definite preference for the opinions of the state’s highest court, the results for the Indiana Court of Appeals do not support this trend. These findings reaffirm that the study of case law remains the single most important facet in legal education of law students. 
Both the Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals consistently cited more often to opinions of state courts from non-contiguous states than to decisions from the state judiciary of the above mentioned contiguous states, contrary to expectations. These courts seem willing to examine the decisions and laws of any other jurisdiction when confronting novel issues. This translates into the conclusion that there is no significant benefit to increasing the collection of the Ruth Lilly Law Library with materials from contiguous states rather than those from non-contiguous states.   
Next, the study provides clear evidence that scholarly writing has not had a significant effect on either of the studied Indiana appellate courts during the last decade. This does not mean that the role of secondary authority is diminished in legal education of law students. This finding merely reiterates that secondary resources are not relied on much by the two highest courts in Indiana as citing authorities. 
The authors also found that there were a significant number of citations pertaining to state court procedure and ethics rules utilized by both courts, but that neither court cited significantly to federal court rules.  The vast majority of citations from this category related to Indiana procedural and ethics rules where the Indiana Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction.  Finally, it is important to mention that neither court cited much to either state or federal administrative laws in the studied sample.
The most intriguing findings came from the studied sample of Indiana appellate briefs, which are collected by the Ruth Lilly Law Library. Both courts exhibited a significant rise in the citation to Indiana appellate briefs during the first three sample years, even though both exhibited a drop in citations to these briefs in 2003. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable conclusion that these resources represent a significant portion of all citations in appellate decision by the two studied courts.  Technical services and reference law librarians should take note of this trend. A general increase in the trend of citations to Indiana appellate briefs, as well as their uniqueness as resources, provide solid justification for their continued collection and availability to practicing attorneys, law faculty, law students, and the general public. 
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Indiana Supreme Court	484	702	868	852	2906	31.19%
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Indiana Supreme Court	198	347	461	324	1330	16.74%
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